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Abstract
Listed companies in the UK are required to comply or give reasons for non-compliance with the 
recommendations of the UK code of corporate governance called ‘The Combined Code’.  Prior 
studies investigating the relationship between compliance and firm performance have found the 
link  to  be  either  non-existent  or  at  best  weak.     This  study, taking a  more  holistic  view of 
compliance develops an index of non-compliance for a panel of FTSE 350 companies for four 
years (2000 -2003 inclusive).  Using total shareholder return (TSR) i.e. the sum of capital gain
and dividend yield, as the main measure of firm performance, we find that the Index is inversely 
related to  the TSR,  implying  that  more compliant firms enjoy higher TSR in  our sample of 
companies.   Contrary to the widely held assumption in the literature that governance variables 
are generally endogenous, our direct test for the endogeneity of the Index, finds no evidence of 
endogeneity.  This implies that the causality most likely runs from the Index to performance, 
rather than the other way round.   One reason for the clear contrast of our findings with previous 
work could be our choice of performance measure.  Assuming that compliance with the Code is 
essentially a means of signalling to the investors that firms are well governed and by implication 
working in the interest of the shareholders, the effects of such positive perception can be argued 
to fall more on market driven measures of firm performance than on measures which rely more 
on accounting based values, such as the various proxies for Tobin’s Q.  Another reason could be 
the emphasis on constructing a finely tuned, comprehensive Index, incorporating elements of 
compliance with both the letter as well as the spirit of the Code.  Overall, our results suggest that 
for  today’s  informed  and  discerning  investors,  compliance  matters  not  just  as  a  box  ticking 
exercise but as a real change in the governance of large listed companies, for which they are 
willing to pay a premium.
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THE UK CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LINK BETWEEN 
COMPLIANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
1.0 Introduction
The aim of all governance mechanisms is to reduce the agency costs that exist due to the 
separation of ownership and control especially in large public corporations (Jensen and 
Meckling,  1976).    A  net  reduction  in  agency  costs  should,  in  theory,  help  increase 
corporate  value  and/or  improve  corporate  performance.    This  is  the  main  argument 
guiding  the  bulk  of  the  research  conducted  on  the  subject  in  the  UK,  US  and  other 
countries.      
In the UK, the reports issued by the various committees (Cadbury, 1992; Greenbury; 
1995;  Hampel,  1998;  Turnbull,  1999;  Smith,  2003;  and  Higgs,  2003),  set  up  to 
investigate and recommend sound corporate governance principles and practices, have 
formed the basis of the Combined Code, henceforth called the Code, which is the main 
document  guiding  UK  listed  companies  in  establishing  their  corporate  governance 
structures and practices.  The Code forms part of the listing requirements for the London 
Stock Exchange, so listed companies are required to comment on compliance or non-
compliance in their annual reports.   
Earlier studies in the UK investigating the compliance-performance link have generally 
attempted  to  establish  the  link  between  specific  Code  recommendations  and  firm 
performance/value (Vafeas  and Theodorou,  1998;  Weir,  Laing and McKnight, 2002).  
This paper takes  a more holistic approach towards compliance,  asking whether those 
companies which are more compliant with the Code perform better than those that are 
less  compliant.    It  does  so  by  developing  a  non-compliance  index  for  a  panel  of 
companies which are constituents of the FTSE 350 from 2000 to 2003.  The approach 
used is  similar to that of Gompers,  Ishii  and Metrick (2003), and Klapper and  Love 
(2002) in the US, who use sets of governance structures rather than single measures in 
their research on the governance/performance link.  
Researchers increasingly suggest that the governance/performance link is endogenous, 
but  often  the  endogeneity  is  assumed  rather  than  explicitly  tested  (e.g.  Agrawal  and 
Knoeber, 1996; Weir, Laing and Mcknight, 2002).  We find that the non-compliance 
index is exogenous, and that greater non-compliance with the Code implies lower total 
shareholder returns in our sample of companies.  
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  section  2  reviews  the  literature  on 
governance  and  performance,  section  3  discusses  the  data,  the  sample  and  the 
development of the non-compliance index, henceforth called the Index, section 4 presents 
the Index and sample analysis, section 5 presents the empirical results, whereas section 6 
checks the robustness of these results. This is followed by a discussion in section 7 and 
section 8 concludes the paper.4
2.0 Governance and performance: the elusive link
Following the implications of agency theory, researchers in both the US and the UK have 
attempted  to  establish  the  link  between  various  measures  of  governance  and  firm 
performance/value.  
One important theme of this research has been the study of the link between ownership 
structure and firm performance.  Morck  et. al. (1988) and McConnell and Serveas (1990) 
using Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm performance, find an overall non-linear relationship 
between ownership structure and firm performance in listed companies in the US, with 
management being aligned with shareholder interests at relatively low and high equity 
levels with signs of entrenchment at the intermediate levels (although the levels of equity 
ownership leading to alignment and entrenchment differ in the two papers: Morck et. al.
finding alignment below 5% and above 25% levels of ownership and McConnell and 
Serveas reporting alignment up to 40%-50%).  Both studies use Tobin’s Q measured as 
the estimated market value of the firm (total assets) divided by its estimated replacement 
cost, to measure performance. 
Results  from  studies  in  the  UK  however  are  inconclusive,  as  some  researchers,  for 
example Short and Keasey (1999) find results similar to those of Morck  et. al. in the US, 
that is a non-linear relationship with  alignment occuring at above 12% as against Morck 
et. al.’s 5%. On the other hand, Faccio and Lasfer (1999) and Weir, Laing and McKnight 
(2002) do not find any association between ownership structure and firm performance.  
The results however seem to be sensitive to the measure of firm performance chosen.  
The  non-linear  relationship  between  ownership  and  performance  is  found  when 
performance  is  measured  by  the  market  to  book  value  of  equity;  while  no  such 
relationship is  found when performance is  measured by the market to  book value of 
assets.
Another  central  topic  of  research  on  the  governance/performance  link  has  been  the 
relationship between board characteristics and firm performance.  According to agency 
theory, the board plays the pivotal role in mitigating the agency problems that exist in 
public corporations, by exercising its monitoring and decision control activities over the 
functioning of the top management  (Jensen and Meckling 1976;  Fama, 1980)
These functions of the board have, over the last decade or so, become more systematised 
through  the  institutionalisation  of  various  board  committees,  namely  the  audit, 
remuneration and nomination  committees.  To perform their monitoring and decision 
control  roles  effectively,    these  committees  are  expected  to  be  composed  mainly  of 
directors “independent” of the company, called simply independent/outside directors in 
the  US,  and  non-executives  in  the  UK;  their  actual  ‘independence’  being  a  separate 
matter.
Consequently  most  research  in  this  area,  both  in  the  US  as  well  as  in  the  UK,  has 
attempted  to  establish  the  link  between  various  board  characteristics  and  firm 
performance. Studies on the subject, however, have so far produced inconclusive results.   5
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and Black (1999) in the US, for example, find 
no significant relationship between board characteristics and firm performance.  Some 
studies  however,  for  example  Rosenstien  and  Wyatt  (1990)  find  a  favourable  stock 
market response  to  the  announcement of the  appointment  of outside  directors on the 
board as evidenced by a positive excess return around the announcement time.   
Following the focal attention given by the Cadbury Report of 1992 to the board’s role in 
improving  the  governance  of  companies  in  the  UK,  a  number  of  researchers  have 
attempted to establish the link between ‘improved’ governance in companies following 
compliance with the Cadbury recommendations and firm performance. The results are 
largely  inconclusive.    Vafeas  and  Theodorou  (1998),  for  example,  conduct  a  cross 
sectional  regression  analysis  of  firm  value  on  certain  aspects  of  the  boards  in  UK, 
namely, the proportion  of non-executive  directors  on the  board,  board  stockholdings, 
chairman/CEO  role  split,  and  proportion  of  non-executive  directors  on  board  sub-
committees  for  250  large  publicly  traded  firms  in  the  UK  for  1994.    They  find  no 
significant relationship between any of these variables and firm value as measured by the 
market to book value of total assets, which they use as a proxy for Tobin’s Q.   Similar 
results  are  also  found  by  Weir,  Laing  and  McKnight  (2002),  who  conduct  a  cross-
sectional analysis of 311 UK companies for 1996, to investigate the relationship between 
company performance and a set of corporate governance mechanisms including board 
structure variables. Specifically, the researchers investigate the relationship between the 
Q ratio (measured as market capitalisation plus total debt divided by total assets) used as 
a measure of firm performance, and six governance mechanisms, namely, board structure 
variables  (duality,  presence  of  audit  committee,  percentage  of  non-executives,  and 
percentage  of  independent  non-executives),  incentive  (managerial)  shareholdings, 
takeover probability by sector, quality of audit committee, audit committee structure, and 
leverage.  They control for the size of the firm, which they expect to be negatively related 
to performance based on Fama and French (1992) and for capital expenditure, which 
according  to  them  is  a  measure  of  potential  future  returns.    They  do  not  find  any 
significant cross-sectional relationship between their measure of performance and their 
governance variables including board variables.  However, they do point out a number of 
caveats  in  their  study,  including  their  imprecise  measures  of  certain  board  variables 
including the independence of the non-executive directors. 
One important reason hypothesised by some researchers for the apparently insignificant 
relationship between various governance-related variables and firm performance, is the 
potentially endogenous nature of the relationship between the two, with the implication 
that if the governance mechanisms are optimally chosen, a lack of significant relationship 
between governance variables and firm performance in a carefully specified regression 
simply denotes that the system is in equilibrium.  
Early proponents of such potential endogeneity are Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) in the 
US,  who  in  their  study  have  hypothesised  that  the  link  between  various  governance 
mechanisms such as insider shareholdings and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q 
may be endogenous with causality running both ways, i.e. higher insider shareholdings 
may lead to better firm performance; conversely better firm performance, may lead to 6
insiders holding a larger number of the company’s shares (perhaps as a consequence of 
the reward for better performance).  Hence, finding no significant relationship between 
various  governance mechanisms  and firm performance in  a carefully specified  cross-
sectional regression would  simply signify that  the companies are in  equilibrium  with 
respect to their governance choices.  
 A notable caveat of Agrawal and Knoeber’s (1996) study, however, is that they a priori
assume endogeneity, without specifically testing for whether any particular governance 
variable  is  actually  endogenous.    Furthermore,  even  if  their  assumed  variables  are 
endogenous,  Bohren  and  Odegaard  (2003)  question  the  validity  of  their  choice  of 
instruments, in the absence of any sound theoretical or methodological basis guiding such 
choice.   These criticisms are supported by the fact that the relationship between the 
number of outside directors on the boards and firm performance remains significant in 
their  sample  of  400  large  US  firms,  in  both  a  carefully  specified  cross-sectional 
regression as well as within a simultaneous framework.  
  
Subsequent to the work of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), researchers in the UK have also 
tested for the potential endogeneity of the relationship between governance mechanisms 
and firm performance.  Again, a major problem with these studies is that the endogeneity 
of  the  variables  of  interest  is  a  priori  assumed,  without  testing  whether  a  particular 
variable is actually endogenous.  Hence, Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) simply assume 
the variables they suspect to be endogenous and proceed using techniques suitable for 
handling  endogenous  variables.    Assuming  that  the  lack  of  significance  of  the 
relationship between firm value and their two important explanatory variables, namely 
director ownership and percentage of non-executive directors on the board in an OLS 
regression, could be driven by endogeneity, the researchers further test the relationship 
between  these  variables  and  firm  value  using  2SLS  technique.  While  still  being 
insignificant, the fact that the signs on both of the explanatory variables change under the 
2SLS technique points to the instability of their results.  This also casts doubt on their 
endogeneity  assumption  as  well  as  on  the  validity  of  their  testing  methodology.  The 
direct testing for endogeneity and the use of appropriate instruments if endogeneity is 
present, thus becomes crucial in research in the field of corporate governance. 
Weir, Laing and Mcknight (2002) also test for the potential endogeneity between their 
governance variables and performance measure, by using a lag of the dependent variable 
in  their  model.  However,  they  themselves  point  out  the  inadequacy  of  their  testing 
methodology which they attribute to data constraints, and they too like others before 
assume endogeneity without specifically testing for it. The issue of potential endogeneity 
between  governance  related  variables  and  firm  performance,  thus  remains  an  open 
question especially in the context of industrialised countries including the UK.  
2.1 Do companies choose governance mechanisms as a set?     
Following Danielson and Karpoff  (1998)  in the US, who found that firms tend to use 
certain governance provisions such as supermajority vote requirements, classified boards 
and shareholder meeting requirements in concert,  researchers have recognized that firms 7
tend to choose governance mechanisms as a set.  Consequently, a number of the most 
recent studies have constructed indices incorporating the firms’ governance choices and 
then attempted to study the link between these indices and firm performance.  
One  notable  study  is  by  Gompers,  Ishii  and  Metrick  (2003)  who  use  a  large  set  of 
governance  provisions  to  construct  a  firm-level  governance  index  to  proxy  for  the 
strength  of  shareholder  rights.  Using  the  data  derived  from  the  publications  of  the 
Investor Responsibility Research Centre, the researchers develop the governance index 
(G), which signifies the presence of provisions that reduce shareholder rights.  There 
being 24 such unique provisions, the higher the points received by a firm, the lower the 
shareholder rights in that firm.    
The researchers find evidence that firms in the lowest decile of the Index, denoting the 
strongest shareholder rights enjoy significantly higher stock returns, an average of 8.5% 
per year than those in the highest decile of the index signifying firms with the weakest 
shareholder rights. 
In the search for industry and firm specific factors influencing the choice of governance 
mechanisms, Gillan, Hartzell and Starks (2003) develop four indices: one each for board 
characteristics, corporate charter provisions, state of incorporation, and an overall index.  
Their  results  suggest  some  correlation  between  industry  and  firm  characteristics  and 
board structures.  Overall, their results support a positive relationship between higher 
board monitoring and greater industry growth opportunities and a negative relationship 
between  board  index  and  product  uniqueness,  implying  that  industries  with  unique 
products are less likely to have high board monitoring.  They also find that industries 
with greater financial leverage have less restrictive governance structures.  In terms of 
firm specific factors, although these generally lack significance in explaining governance 
choices, the researchers find that older firms appear to have stronger board structures, 
implying that firm age may also matter in terms of the choice of governance mechanisms 
adopted by a firm.     
A recent study using the index approach in an emerging markets context, is by Klapper 
and Love (2002) who, using the data set developed by Credit Lyonnaise Securities Asia 
(CLSA)  on  corporate  governance  rankings  for  495  firms  across  25  countries  and  18 
sectors,  investigate  the  relationship  between  governance  and  firm  performance.  The 
researchers find that  good governance is  positively  correlated with  market  valuations 
(Tobin’s Q) and operating performance (ROA) especially in countries with weaker legal 
systems. 
A more recent study adopting an approach quite similar to the one undertaken in this 
work  is  by  Black,  Jang  and  Kim  (2005),  who  develop  a  comprehensive  corporate 
governance index for a cross section of 515 firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange.   
Using the instrumental variables approach and testing directly for the endogeneity of their 
index, the researchers do not find evidence of endogeneity in their governance index, 
which is found to be significantly positively correlated with higher firm value.  No such 
relationship is however, found for the accounting measures of performance.  In line with 8
the approach of this study, the researchers attribute the strength of their work to their use 
of a comprehensive set of governance provisions including those related to the board in 
the development of their governance index.     
In sum, the use of indices in evaluating a firm’s choice of governance structures has 
become a popular methodological approach as increasingly companies around the world 
are required to comply with a comprehensive set of governance-related recommendations 
put forward by their respective regulatory bodies.  The relationship between ‘improved 
governance’ as reflected by higher compliance and firm performance, thus, becomes an 
important topic of research.  This is the central issue examined in this study.
With the introduction of compliance with the Code in the UK as one of the requirements 
for the listing of companies, it makes sense to look at the relationship between firms’ sets 
of governance choices as reflected by their compliance with different elements of the 
Code and firm performance rather than studying these relationships in terms of isolated 
elements of compliance.  This study therefore adopts the index approach to studying 
compliance, with the focus on compliance in respect of the recommendations related to 
the board, the main internal governance mechanism in public companies.  To account for 
the impact of other governance-related variables which may affect firm performance, the 
study also incorporates board size, internal and external block shareholdings, firm size 
and leverage as additional explanatory variables.
The foregoing review of the literature also suggests a number of other issues that remain 
unresolved  by  current  research  on  the  link  between  governance  measures  and  firm 
performance.   First, previous research findings suggest that the link between various 
governance  measures  and  firm  performance  may  be  sensitive  to  the  choice  of 
performance measure used.  One could hypothesize that a possible reason for not finding 
a significant relationship between governance variables and firm performance could be 
that  most  extant  research on  the  subject  uses  performance measures  which  are more 
historical/cost  based  -  Tobin’s  Q  or  its  various  proxies  use  measures  of  book 
value/replacement cost of assets as the base in firm value measures.  These measures may 
not  be  able  to  capture  adequately  the  impact  of  improvement  in  governance  on 
performance, which is likely to be reflected more in current, market based measures of 
performance such as total shareholder return (TSR).  This study accordingly uses TSR as 
the main measure of firm performance, while also testing for the link between accounting 
measures namely return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) and compliance.
Second, whereas theoretically many of the firm’s governance choices are assumed to be 
endogenous, many empirical studies assume away the endogeneity, without specifically 
testing whether any particular governance mechanism is actually endogenous.  This study 
addresses this issue directly, by specifically testing whether the Index is endogenous.  
The study is also the first to employ a comprehensive, reliable and detailed set of panel 
data  in  the  UK  context.    Researchers  have  pointed  to  the  lack  of  adequate  and 
comprehensive data set as one of the important factors constraining meaningful research 
in the field of corporate governance (Bohren and Odegaard, 2003).  9
3.0 Data, sample and the development of the index of non-compliance 
      
Data on corporate governance variables are readily available in the US, thanks to data 
bases  such  as  those  of  Institutional  Shareholder  Services  (ISS)  and  Disclosure
Incorporated.    No  comparable  datasets  however,  are  available  for  UK  companies.   
Consequently, all of the data used in the development of the index of non-compliance 
comes from the annual reports of the individual companies. 
The Index has been developed for those companies which have been constituents of the 
FTSE 350 index for each of the four years (2000-2003 inclusive) of the study.  Financial 
companies and utilities have been excluded as these companies need to follow additional 
regulations and have therefore also been excluded from previous work.  Moreover, to 
make the panel balanced, only those companies which have been part of the FTSE 350 
index for all of the four consecutive financial years have been included in the panel.  This 
obviously does create a survivorship bias in the data set, but at the same time allows us to 
observe  the  changes  in  compliance  for  different  firms  over  time.    Based  on  the 
availability of complete data for all the variables  used in the study, the final sample 
consists of 478 companies: 122 for 2003; 121 for 2002; 121 for 2001; and 114 for 2000.   
Although an attempt has been made to make the panel as balanced as possible, slight 
variation occurs in the number of companies within each year as well as within each 
industrial sector due to missing data for some companies in some years, mainly 2000. 
The Index is based on the 1998 version of the Code.  This version recommends that one 
third  of  the  directors  should  be  non-executives,  the  majority  of  whom  should  be 
independent.    These  directors  should  sit  on  the  remuneration,  audit  and  nomination 
committees required by the Code.  Furthermore, while the letter of the Code states simply 
that the chairman of the board should not also be the company’s CEO, it implies that a 
non-executive should take the role.  We can see this because the chair of the nomination 
committee is required to be the chairman of the board or a non-executive.  This makes it 
clear that the chairman of the board should be able to act with the same independence as 
a non-executive.  In constructing the index, compliant firms are those whose chairman is 
an independent non-executive.
A new version of the Code was introduced in 2003.  This version defines non-executive 
director independence more elaborately than the earlier version.  According to the new 
version, directors are considered to be independent, if: they have not previously been an 
employee of the company; have no family or business link with it; do not hold any cross 
directorships; do not represent any significant  shareholder; and have not  been on the 
board for more than nine years.  We have chosen to use this criterion in the construction 
of the Index because, like the provision regarding the chairman, it reflects the spirit of the 
1998 Code.
The Index is constructed by assigning one point for each aspect of non-compliance with 
either  the  letter  or  the  spirit  of  the  Code.  Thus,  the  board  should  be  chaired  by  an 
independent non-executive director (0 if so, 1 if not); the board should consist of one-10
third non-executives (0 if so, 1 if not), the majority of whom should be independent (0 if 
so, 1 if not); the board should have a senior independent member other than the chair, to 
whom concerns can be conveyed, (0 if so, 1 if not); board should have a remuneration, 
audit  and  nomination  committee  (0  for  each,  1    for  each  added  if  not  present);  the 
committees should be headed by independent non-executives, (0 if so for each, 1 for each 
if not); the remuneration committee should be composed entirely of independent non-
executives (0 if so, 1 if not); the audit committee should be composed of non-executives 
only, have majority independent non-executives, (0 if so, 1 if not); nomination committee 
be present (0 if so, 1 if not) and finally, the nomination committee should be chaired by 
an independent non-executive, who could be the chairman (0 if so, 1 if not).  With this 
scoring system, a firm’s index score can vary between 0 and 12, with 0 indicating perfect 
compliance and 12 indicating complete non-compliance.  
It is important to note here that in line with the work of previous researchers (Gompers et. 
al., 2003), we have chosen to assign equal weighting i.e. 1 point for non-compliance with 
each aspect of the Code, avoiding making value distinctions in compliance with different 
recommendations.  An added benefit of this approach is that it avoids any sample-specific 
bias  in  the  development  of  the  Index,  which  may  render  the  results  of  this  study 
incomparable with the results of any future work using different samples and different 
weights for different elements of compliance.   
4.0    Index and sample analysis
Table 1 below presents the descriptive statistics on the Index for each of the four years of 
the study. 
Table 1
                          Descriptive statistics for the Index
Index 2003 2002 2001 2000
Mean 1.479339 1.090909 1.690265 2.094737
Standard Error 0.146163 0.120261 0.130689 0.171335
Median 1 1 1 2
Mode 0 0 1 1
Standard 
Deviation
1.607789 1.322876 1.389242 1.669971
Sample Variance 2.584986 1.75 1.929994 2.788802
Kurtosis 1.570356 2.772638 -0.63326 0.960563
Skewness 1.322358 1.60914 0.532959 0.868986
Range 7 6 5 8
Minimum 0 0 0 0
Maximum 7 6 5 8
Sum 179 132 191 199
Count 122 121 121 114
In terms of the pattern in the distribution of the Index means over the four years, it can be 
seen that the Index has the highest mean (2.09) in the year 2000, and has gradually fallen 
over the next two years, suggesting that the firms were becoming more compliant over 11
this period.  This trend is further supported by the value of the mode going from 1 to 0 in 
the years 2002 and 2003. The Index mean however rises again in the year 2003, a trend 
which warrants further investigation as carried out below. 
Table 2 below sheds light on how the Index has varied for the different firms in the 
sample for different years.  These trends ignore missing values for any firm for any given 
year, taking into account only the overall trend for the firm.  
Table 2
Trends in the behaviour of the Index over time (2000 to 2003) 






As the above table indicates, twice as many firms have become more compliant than less 
compliant over the period 2000 to 2003, but the largest share is of the firms whose ratings 
have varied over the four year period.    Table 3 below, therefore, presents a closer look 
at the trend in the variation of the Index for different firms for different years.
Table 3
Year-on-year change in the Index for different firms for different years
Change in the Value of the 
Index in Any Year
Number of Firms % of the Total*
Increase by 1 point 110 88.0
Increase by 2 or more points  73 58.4
Increase by 3 or more points  38 30.4
Increase by 4 or more points  13 10.4
* The percentages do not add up to 100, due to overlaps in the firm numbers in different categories.  The 
total number of firms is 125.
As the above table indicates, of the total 125 firms, 110 that is, 88% of the firms have 
experienced a change in their Index value by 1 point in any given year, which suggests 
that such changes are common and probably reflect routine adjustments to the board.  
However,  a  sizeable  portion  of  the  firms,  51  out  of  125  that  is  about  41%,  have 
experienced a year-on-year change in their Index value of 3 or more points.  Given that 
the number of firms having stable values over the four years (15) is quite similar to the 
number of firms experiencing significant variation in their values, four points or more 
(13), it was considered worthwhile to examine more closely if there were any significant 
differences in the characteristics/circumstances of the two sub-sample of firms.12
A more detailed analysis of the firms having stable ratings revealed that although the 
firms belonged to diverse industrial sectors, most had enjoyed positive stable growth in 
their profitability  over the years with relatively low levels of acquisition and/or sale 
activity, concentrating more on internal expansion and organic growth.
Contrary to this group, firms having significant jumps in their Index values (4 points or 
more) were characterised by significant changes in the company’s circumstances around 
the period of the jump.  Of the 13 companies in this group, 2 had undergone mergers, 6 
had  engaged  in  major  acquisitions  and  disposal  of  assets  including  major  internal 
restructuring, with 5 of these experiencing declining profitability around these periods.  3 
others had a change in the CEO, while 2 had a change of chairman around the period of 
the jump.  For 1 firm nothing significant appeared to have happened except that the firm 
experienced declining profitability in the year preceding the jump (increase) in the Index 
value. It is important to note however, that in general the jump was likely to be in either 
direction, with  Index value  increasing or decreasing  after  a significant  change in  the 
firm’s circumstances, as 7 of the 13 firms experienced a decline while 6 experienced an 
increase in the Index values.  It is worth noting though that in the case of CEO change, 
for two companies the Index value declined substantially after the change, suggesting that 
newer  CEOs  may  tend  to  move  towards  compliance  (support  for  entrenchment 
hypothesis).   Industry concentration also appears to be a relevant factor in explaining 
jumps, as 3 of the 13 firms belonged to the media and entertainment business, 4 to the 
category  of  general  retailers  and  2  belonged  to  the  category  of  mining  and  mineral 
extractors.              
The above findings suggest that the behaviour of the Index appears to correlate to some 
extent with the industrial sector to which a firm belongs.  It would be interesting then to 
observe the sectoral trend in the Index, as presented below, based on the industries being 
classified according to the 2-digit FTSE Global Industrial Classification System. As can 
be seen from table 4, the Index means while showing a declining trend for most industrial 
sectors over the period 2000 to 2002, have registered a substantial increase in 2003 over 
the previous year, particularly for certain sectors including the food and drug retailers 
(101.5%),  media  and  entertainment  (47.6%),  pharmaceutical  and  biotechnology  firms 
(278%), and construction and building materials (432%). 13
Table 4




2003 2002 2001 2000
Software and Computer Services 2.7(4) 2.5(4) 3.5(6) 3.5(2)
Information Technology Hardware 3.0(2) 3.0(2) 1.0(2) 2.0(2)
Oil Integrated 2.0(3) 0.0(0) 1.5(2) 3.0(1)
Telecommunication Services 1.0(2) 0.5(2) 1.0(2) 1.5(2)
Food &Drug Retailers 1.3(3) 0.6(3) 1.0(3) 1.6(3)
Transport 0.7(13) 1.1(13) 2.1(12) 2.1(13)
Support Services 1.3(8) 1.2(8) 1.8(8) 2.2(10)
Media & Entertainment 2.7(8) 1.8(14) 2.1(15) 2.9(16)
Leisure & Hotels 0.7(9) 1.3(9) 1.9(9) 2.2(8)
General Retailers 1.6(13) 1.0(13) 1.4(13) 1.9(13)
Tobacco 0.0(0) 2.0(1) 2.0(1) 0.0(0)
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 2.5(6) 0.6(6) 1.6(6) 1.6(6)
Personal Care & Household 0.0(1) 1.0(1) 1.0(1) 2.0(1)
Health 0.0(2) 0.0(2) 0.0(2) 1(2)
Food Producers & Processors 0.7(4) 1.5(4) 2.6(4) 1.2(4)
Beverages 0.3(3) 0.3(3) 1.0(4) 1.3(3)
Automobiles and Parts 1.0(1) 0.0(1) 2.0(1) 3(1)
Engineering & Machinery 0.7(7) 0.1(7) 1.3(6) 1.6(8)
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 1.0(1) 0.0(1) 1.0(1) 1.0(1)
Aerospace & Defence 1.8(5) 1.0(5) 1.7(4) 2.1(6)
Steel & Other Metals 1.0(1) 0.0(1) 2.0(1) 1.0(1)
Forestry & Paper 0.0(0) 1.0(1) 1.0(1) 1.0(1)
Construction & Bldg. Materials 1.7(14) 0.8(13) 2.2(14) 2.6(17)
Chemicals 1.3(3) 0.2(4) 1.5(4) 1.5(4)
Mineral Extractors & Mines 1.2(4) 0.5(4) 1.5(4) 4.1 (6)
                The figures in the brackets indicate the number of firms in that sector in that year.
A  closer  examination  of  the  firms  in  two  of  these  sectors,  the  first  being  the 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology sector, where the number of firms has remained the 
same over the four years and the second being the media and entertainment sector, where 
the number has almost halved in 2003, reveals that  firms in both these sectors have been 
characterised by significant acquisition and/or restructuring activities in the year 2002, a 
time when the stock market was at its lowest point for the period covered.  Based on this 
finding and the evidence relating to the jumps in Index values in general, one can draw a 
tentative  conclusion  that  acquisition  and/or  restructuring  activities  in  2002  may  be  a 
potential reason why firms’ index means have risen in 2003.  These changes however, 
may represent a temporary disequilibrium and the firms may revert to their lower Index 
values as they return to stability.  
Another interesting observation from table 4 is the systematically high Index means for 
some industries for all four years, such as the IT-related industries and those in the media 14
and entertainment industries.  The study by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) on the distribution 
of corporate ownership in the US, finds that ownership of the firms in the media and 
entertainment  industries  tends  to  be  more  concentrated.    A  finding  which  these 
researchers consider to be consistent with the hypothesis that the “amenity potential”, by 
which they mean the ability to draw utility from the ownership of the firm simply by 
being able to control it and run it according to one’s own preferences and taste, is higher,  
in such firms.  
Hence in firms having higher ‘amenity potential,’ ownership may be more concentrated 
in the hands of families and individuals, since the greater is  their control, the higher is 
the amenity potential/utility to be drawn from such firms.  IT firms such as Microsoft 
(owned  by  Bill  Gates),  and  media  companies,  Daily  Telegraph  and  Hollinger 
International  (Lord  Black,  former  owner)  are  classic  examples  of  such  firms.    The 
systematically high means of the Index for firms in the IT-related industries coupled with 
the high incidence of significant director shareholdings in these firms (2 out of 5 firms in 
this  sector  had  director  shareholdings  above  3%)  provide  some  support  for  the 
entrenchment hypothesis, that is firms having high director shareholdings may be less 
compliant.  Whether less compliant firms also experience lower firm performance, is the 
key question which we address later. 
  
Table 5
Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis





















TSR % 33.68 44.91 -21.91 25.61 1.09 33.9 5.76 33.44
ROA % 9.78 8.73 6.88 14.59 5.93 21.57 7.92 10.45
ROE % 4.50 98.9 14.71 34.67 18.18 42.36 21.37 58.41
Explanatory
Index 1.49 1.6 1.09 1.32 1.75 1.48 2.21 1.84
Board size 10.01 2.3 10.32 2.46 10.23 2.57 10.52 2.61
Total Sales 4909.1 13929.6 3236.9 4236.6 3561.3 5074.3 3313 4948.5
Debt  to  Asset 
(Ratio)
0.24 0.17 0.25 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.20 0.14
Debt  to  Equity 
%
40.33 1356.80 125.23 289.49 101.37 224.74 21.37 58.41
Block  Holdings 
%
28.89 16.4 29.09 17.25 24.81 16.32 24.45 16.31
Director 
Holdings %
2.82 9.89 2.95 10.79 3.41 11.27 2.84 10.10
Firm Age 47.98 36.90 45.27 36.59 47.61 58.78 46.53 36.31
Market  to 
Book(Equity)
5.29 14.64 -2.13 46.78 5.93 21.57 4.64 9.60
In addition to the Index a number of other variables which may affect firm performance 
have been used in establishing the relationship between firm performance and the Index.  
Data on these variables has been obtained from different sources, including the Waterlow 15
Stock Exchange Yearbooks (for data on director and other block shareholdings); from 
Datastream (for all financial data on the firms) and the company annual reports for the 
data on board size.  Table 5 above presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables 
used in the following analysis.
As can be seen from table 5, TSR has been the highest in the year 2003.  This appears to 
be because the market has been falling during the years 2000, 2001 and 2002, leading to a 
declining TSR over these years, with the TSR actually becoming negative in 2002.  The 
market  appears  to  have  made  a  substantial  recovery  in  the  year  2003,  leading  to  a 
substantial rise in the TSR for the year.  Consistent with the explanation for the trend in 
the TSR, the ROE has continued to fall over the four years.  ROA has also been low in 
the years 2001 and 2002, but has risen considerably in the year 2003, consistent with 
substantial rise in total sales for the year, as the market recovered.
In terms of governance related variables, average board size is more or less the same over 
the years (about 10 members), as are the average block holdings of shares.  Director 
holdings of shares are also similar over the years, except for 2001 when they have shown 
a  significant  increase,  rising  from  2.84  to  3.41  percent  of  total  shares  outstanding, 
registering a 20% increase in total director holdings over the previous year.  The rise in 
director  shareholdings  in  2001  over  2000  could  have  been  motivated  by  the  higher 
average return on equity in 2000 (21.37%), encouraging directors to invest more in the 
shares of the company or simply because as the market was falling over the period, it 
may have been a good time to buy the shares.    
5.0 Link  between  corporate  governance  and  firm  performance:  empirical 
analysis
We now investigate the link between compliance with the Code and measures of firm 
performance.  Prior evidence in the UK (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Weir, Laing and 
McKnight, 2002) suggests the link to be either non-existent or at best weak.  However, 
most of the earlier studies have used a proxy of Tobin’s Q (most commonly, market value 
of equity plus book value of debt to book value of total assets) as the main measure of 
firm performance.  
Given that one of the most important reasons for introducing the Code in the UK was to 
help restore investor confidence following the shake up of the 1980s, one could argue 
that the main impact of the perceived improved governance in the firms following the 
adoption of the Code’s best practice would be on the market value of the firms. Hence the 
link between improved governance and firm performance would be best captured by a 
measure of firm performance which provides a good reflection of market value.  
Total shareholder return (TSR) defined as the sum of capital gain and dividend yield, is a 
good candidate for measuring current market performance of the firm, as contrary to 
Tobin’s Q or its oft used proxy, market to book value of assets, it better incorporates 
elements of current market value (both capital gain as well as dividend yield use market 
price of the share as the base in the calculations). The often used proxy of Tobin’s Q that 16
is, the market value of equity plus the book value of debt divided by the book value of 
assets is more a historical accounting based measure of performance.  TSR is also the 
main measure used by firms themselves to gauge their own performance and for setting 
management  compensation.    Hence,  the  main  variable  of  interest  in  measuring 
performance in this study is the total shareholder return (TSR). However, the relationship 
between  the  Index  and  two  accounting  measures  of  performance,  namely  Return  on 
Assets (ROA) that is, EBIT divided by the book value of total assets, and Return on Book 
Equity (ROE) which is net income divided by book value of equity, is also explored in 
order to investigate whether improved governance as reflected by higher compliance also 
translates into better operating performance.
Accordingly, the full model we test is the following: 
Firm  performance=  β1 index  +  β2 board  size  +β3 size  +β4 leverage  +  β5 block 
holdings+  β6 director holdings  + year dummies (β7y1+ β8y2+β9y3+β10y4) + ε
In the above model, firm performance stands for all the measures of performance, namely 
the  TSR,  ROA  and  ROE.    Given  the  nature  of  the  Index,  being  a  measure  of  non-
compliance, one would expect to find a negative relationship between the Index and each 
measure of firm performance.
The  model  includes  other  potential  governance-related  variables  namely  board  size,  
block holdings and director shareholdings, while controlling for leverage and the size of 
the firm - other variables which may affect firm performance.  
Starting with Yermack (1996), a number of researchers including Eisenberg et. al. (1998) 
have  investigated  the  relationship  between  board  size  and  various  measures  of  firm 
performance.  The negative relationship between performance and board size has become 
one of the few empirical regularities observed in the research in the field of corporate 
governance.  Consequently we expect a negative relationship between board size and all 
measures of firm performance in our analysis. 
According to agency theory managerial ownership is an important governance-related 
variable,  whose  relationship  with  firm  performance/value  has  been  extensively 
investigated in the US as well as in the UK.  As mentioned earlier, prior evidence in the 
UK  has  been  inconclusive.    The  current  study  further  explores  this  relationship  by 
including  director  share  ownership  above  3%  (cumulative),  as  a  control.    Given  the 
nature of the previous UK evidence the relationship between director shareholdings and 
firm performance remains an open question.
Block holders other than directors include the institutional shareholders who make up 
between  65%-75% of ownership of large listed companies in the UK (Dedman, 2002), as 
well as other block holders holding stakes above 3%.   Although the Code in the UK calls 
for  institutional  shareholders  to  play  an  active  role  in  corporate  governance,  prior 
evidence on the impact of institutional shareholdings on firm performance in the UK is 
found to be generally insignificant, but mixed. Whereas Short and Keasey (1999) find a 17
statistically insignificant but positive relationship between institutional shareholdings and 
firm performance, Weir,  Laing  and McKnight (2002) report an insignificant negative 
relationship between the two.  The two studies however use different measures of firm 
performance.   The American and other international evidence generally suggests that the 
costs  of  monitoring  by  institutional  shareholders  exceed  the  benefits  (Agrawal  and 
Knoeber, 1996; Gillan et. al. 2003; Bohren and Odegaard, 2003).  If one is to go by most 
of the prior UK and US evidence, one would expect to find a generally insignificant but 
negative relationship between block holdings including institutional shareholdings and 
the  market  measures  of  firm  performance,  although  the  relationship  with  accounting 
measures, if any, remains an open question.  
Size and leverage are two other measures often related to firm performance.  We use total 
sales as a measure of size, and the ratio of total book value of debt to total book value of 
assets as a measure of leverage. Based on prior US as well as UK evidence, (Fama and 
French, 1992; Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Weir, Laing and McKnight, 2002) size is 
expected to be negatively related to the market measure of performance namely TSR, 
whereas it is expected to be positively related to the accounting measures, as controlling 
for other factors, the higher the firm’s sales, the higher the return on assets and also the 
return on equity. 
Theoretically speaking, the relationship between leverage and firm performance could be 
either negative or positive depending on the type of firm, particularly in terms of its 
investment opportunities.  Jensen (1986) argues that for firms with high free cash flows 
and low investment opportunities, debt can help limit the “overinvestment problem” by 
forcing companies to pay out the higher free cash flows in the form of higher interest 
payments, thus suggesting a positive relationship between debt and firm value.  Contrary 
to this, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) argue that highly leveraged firms 
may forego good investment opportunities due to the debt overhang problem, creating the 
agency cost of debt and thus implying lower firm value.   Moreover, Jung, Kim and Stulz  
(1996) suggest that firms with good investment opportunities (and by implication higher 
values) may prefer to use more outside equity than debt.   Most international empirical 
evidence supports the latter two propositions in terms of the relationship between debt 
and various measures of firm performance, both market based as well as accounting, 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Short and Keasey, 1999; Booth et. al. 2001; and Weir, 
Laing  and  McKnight,  2002).    Consistent  with  prior  evidence,  we  expect  a  negative 
relationship between leverage and all measures of firm performance.
As the study uses pooled cross section time series data, year dummies are included in all 
specifications to capture the effect of variation in time. 
Table  6  below  shows  the  results  of  the  initial  analysis.    The  Index  is  significantly 
negatively  associated  with  TSR,  although no  significant relationship  is  found  for  the 
accounting measures of firm performance. In the case of ROA, the relationship although 
insignificant is still negative. These results are generally consistent with our earlier stated 
argument  that  compliance  with  the  Code  is  essentially  a  means  of  signalling  to  the 
investors that companies are following good governance practices and by implication, 18
working in the interests of the shareholders.  The impact of such favourable perception by 
the investors is likely to fall more on the market valuation of the companies than on 
accounting returns.   
TABLE 6
Regression estimates of the full model for all dependent variables
Explanatory Dependent Dependent Dependent
TSR ROA ROE
Index -2.09** -0.32 0.71
(-2.01) (-0.75) (0.38)
Board size -0.37 -1.15*** -1.95
(-.54) (-4.05) (-1.57)
Size -0.33E-4 0.14E-4 0.23E-4
(-1.58) (1.69) (0.61)
Leverage -4.51 -10.23*** -67.85***
(-0.44) (-2.45) (-3.73)
 Block Holdings -0.06 -0.02 -0.03
(-0.60) (-0.65) (-0.18)
Director Holdings -0.11 -0.02 0.20
(-0.73) (-0.40) (0.72)
Y1/2003 45.42*** 24.44*** 38.85***
(5.52) (7.22) (2.63)
Y2/2002 -11.39 22.10*** 50.86***
(-1.35) (6.36) (3.35)
Y3/2001 12.75 20.84*** 51.61***
(1.54) (6.13) (3.48)
Y4/2000 18.23** 23.08*** 53.53***
(2.14) (6.61) (3.51)
R-Squared 0.25 0.06 0.04
R-Bar Squared 0.24 0.04 0.03
No. of Observations 478 478 478
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level. t-statistics are in parenthesis.
In  terms  of  the  other  explanatory  variables  in  the  above  regressions,  the  results  are 
broadly  consistent  with  a  priori  expectations.   In line  with  the  findings  of  Yermack 
(1996)  and  many  subsequent  studies,  board  size  is  found  to  be  inversely  related  to 
accounting measures of firm performance, with high level of significance with the ROA, 
but not significantly related to market returns.  This is quite consistent with the notion 
that generally, UK boards are larger than their optimal size, with subsequent operational 
inefficiencies  setting  in  such  as  difficulties  with  communication,  control  and 
accountability, factors which would in turn affect operational efficiency of the firm.   
Size in terms of total sales, although insignificant in all of the above models, is positively 
related to accounting measures of return.  This is expected given that the higher are the 
sales,  the  higher  is  the  level  of  book  returns,  keeping  other  factors  constant.    The 
insignificant  but  negative  relationship  of  size  with  TSR  suggests  that  managers  are 
perhaps  over  investing  in  their  firms,  letting  them  grow  in  size  and  sales  above  the 
optimal level as viewed by investors.
The negative relationship of leverage with all measures of firm performance is consistent 
with  previous  empirical  findings  (Weir,  Laing  and  McKnight,  2002;  Vafeas  and 
Theodorou, 1998; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). The relationship however is found to be 19
significant only with respect to the accounting measures of profitability, suggesting that 
more profitable firms tend to use less debt or in other words prefer financial slack rather 
than using more debt which may restrict their financial flexibility. 
Although  lacking  overall  significance,  the  negative  relationship  of  both  block 
shareholdings and director shareholdings with TSR as well as ROA, is consistent with a 
priori expectations and previous empirical findings.    It  appears that if at all, higher 
institutional shareholdings as well as higher director shareholdings lead to greater agency 
costs  than  benefits  for  the  firm.    In  terms  of  the  relationship  with  ROE,  although 
insignificant, director shareholdings are positively related.  This is consistent with the 
earlier analysis of table 5, wherein we suggest that rising director shareholdings in the 
years 2002 and 2003 could be motivated by rising ROE for these years. 
Given the overall lack of significance of the relationship between the Index and both the 
accounting  measures  of  firm  performance, and  the  low  overall  explanatory power  of 
these regressions, all subsequent analysis relates specifically to the relationship between 
the TSR and the Index.  Furthermore, since board size, leverage, director holdings and 
block holdings are found to be insignificant in the original model related to the TSR, we 
drop each of these variables one at a time from the subsequent regressions, following the 
Hendry (LSE) general to specific approach and see how the dropping of insignificant 
variables affects the results.  
TABLE 7
Additional models. Dependent variable is the TSR.
Explanatory Model  1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Index -2.13** -2.12** -2.12** -2.29**
(-2.05) (-2.05) (-2.05) (-2.24)
Board size - - - -
- - - -
Size -.37E-4* -.37E-4* -.36E-4* -.34E-4
(-1.88) (-1.86) (-1.82) (-1.76)
Leverage -4.79 - - -
(-0.47) - - -
Block Holdings -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -
(-0.59) (-0.67) (0.69) -
Dir. Holdings -0.11 -0.10 - -
(-0.71) (-0.69) - -
Y1/2003 41.89*** 40.87*** 40.73*** 38.80***
((8.23) (8.87) (8.85) (10.62)
Y2/2002 -15.12*** -16.17*** -16.34*** -18.29***
(-3.04) (-3.63) (-3.68) (-5.32)
Y3/2001 9.09* 0.14* 7.96* 6.35*
(1.87) (1.84) (1.81) (1.70)
Y4/2000 14.47*** 13.62*** 13.56*** 12.00***
(2.91) (2.94) (2.92) (2.96)
R-Squared 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
R-Bar-Squared 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
No. of  Obs.  478 478 478 478
*,  **,  ***  denote  significance  at  the  0.10,  0.05,  and  0.01  level.    t-statistics  are  in 
parentheses.20
We retain size from the original model because although insignificant, its t-ratio is much 
higher than that for all the other variables.  The results from these subsequent regressions 
are reported in Table 7. 
As can be seen from the above results, the dropping of insignificant variables, board size 
in model 1, board size and leverage in model 2, board size, leverage and director holdings 
in model 3 and additionally block holdings in model 4, does not materially change the 
results  with  the  coefficients,  signs  and  the  significance  of  the  remaining  explanatory 
variables, namely Index, size and the year dummies remaining stable over each model.  
Hence, the overall explanatory power of model 4, even with all insignificant variables 
omitted, does not change.  This indicates the stability of the relationship between the 
Index and firm performance.   However, the dropping of insignificant variables does 
create  the  problem  of  heteroscedasticity  in  the  regressions,  due  to  the  omission  of 
relevant variables, which we address in the section below.
6.0 Checks for the robustness of the results
6.1 Additional control variables
To  check  for  the  robustness  of  the  reported  results,  i.e.  to  further  check  that  the 
relationship between TSR and the Index is not spurious, with the Index substituting for 
some other factor affecting performance, we add a number of variables to model 4 in 
Table 7  to see if any of these change the results significantly.  
First, in line with the controls used by Vafeas and Theodorou (1998), Klapper and Love 
(2002), and Adams and Mehran (2004) to account for the impact of accounting measures 
of firm performance on market measures, we add accounting return on assets as a control 
in  the  base  model.    Addition  of  this  variable  also  corrects  for  the  problem  of 
heteroscedasticity  observed  due  to  the  omission  of  significant  explanatory  variables.  
Second, following Yermack (1996), we add firm age as a control.  Market to book value 
of equity is another measure which partly reflects the growth opportunities available to a 
firm.  So we also test the relationship of this variable with firm performance.  Finally, 
following  Vafeas  and  Thoedorou  (1998),  Gillan  et  al  (2003)  and  a  number  of  other 
researchers, 2-digit industry dummies are added to control for any industry-related factors 
affecting performance.  The results in table 8 show only those industry dummies found to 
be significant.      
Table 8 shows the results from adding the different controls starting with the ROA.  We 
test the significance of each additional control and retain it in the subsequent models only 
if the variable is found to be significant.  Hence, in model 1 in table 7, we only add ROA 
to the base model which we retain in model 2 as it is significant at 1% level. Addition of 
ROA  also  corrects  for  the  problem  of  heteroscedasticity  created  due  to  omission  of 
significant explanatory variables.  We then add market to book value of equity in model 
2,  but  drop  it  in  model  3  because of  its  insignificance, while  adding  age  as  another 
control.  Finally, in model 4, we add industry dummies for the 25 sectors represented in 
the sample. As can be seen the Index stays significant in all specifications.    21
In terms of the other controls added, apart from the ROA, which one would expect to 
have  a  positive  and  significant  relationship  with  market  returns,  only a  few  industry 
effects  are  found  to  be  significant,  namely  those  of  IT  hardware  industry  (IN1)  ,  
electronic  and  electrical  equipment  industry  (IN16)  and  construction  and  building 
materials industry (IN17).  Neither the market to book value of equity nor the age of the 
firm is found to have any significant relationship with our measure of firm performance.  
TABLE 8
Results from models incorporating additional controls
Dependent variable is the TSR.
Explanatory Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Index -2.05** -2.05** -1.97** -1.85*
(-2.04) (-2.04) (1.96) (-1.81)
Size -0.37E-4* -0.37E-4* -0.39E-4** -0.22E-4
(-1.92) (-1.91) (-2.04) (-0.90)
Y1/2003 33.69*** 33.59*** 32.02*** 28.31***
(9.00) (8.94) (7.78) (2.74)
Y2/2002 -21.90*** -21.85*** -23.50*** -27.71***
(-6.35) (-6.32) (-6.15) (-2.81)
Y3/2001 3.06 2.99 1.33 -1.92
(0.82) (0.80) (0.32) (-0.19)
Y4/2000 7.61* 7.52* 0.88 1.44
(1.86) (1.84) (1.32) (0.14)
ROA 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.42***
(4.66) (4.64) (4.61) (3.78)










R-Squared 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
R-Bar-Squared 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
No. Of  Obsv. 478 478 478 478
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level. t-statistics are in parentheses.
The persistent significance of the Index in all model specifications, lends support to our a 
priori expectations, which are also consistent with the assertion of Bohren and Odegaard 
(2003) that most governance mechanisms tend to be independent (exogenous) and can be 
analyzed individually in terms of their relationship with firm performance measures.  In 
other words, the relationship of one mechanism with firm performance may not depend 
on that of the other.   In the following section we directly test for the exogeneity of our 
Index, in order to confirm or otherwise, our a priori expectations.     22
6.2     Test for determining the exogeneity of the Index
As pointed out earlier, most extant research assumes away the endogeneity of governance 
variables  and  offers  it  as  a  possible  explanation  for  the  absence  of  a  significant 
relationship  between  governance  and  firm  performance  measures  (Weir,  Laing  and 
McKnight, 2002. Alternatively, the lack of significance in a carefully specified system of 
equations  supports  the  optimal  choice  hypothesis,  with  governance  measures  being 
optimally chosen by a firm (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996).  
Such an approach suffers from a number of methodological weaknesses.   First, the a 
priori assumption of endogeneity is not valid, without any specific testing of whether any 
particular variable is actually endogenous.  Second, even if endogeneity is found, dealing 
with it requires choice of appropriate instruments which need to be correlated (preferably 
highly)  with  the  variable  suspected  to  be  endogenous,  but  not  with  the  dependent 
variable.  To the best of our knowledge, no study in this field until very recently (Black, 
Jang and Kim, 2005) has addressed these issues in a methodologically sound manner.  
None have done so, in the context of the UK and the US (Black et.al.’s study uses Korean 
data).
Given that the main relationship of interest in this study is that between the Index and 
firm performance, and given that we are using panel data, we perform a Wu-Hausman  
exogeneity  test  on  our  main  explanatory  variable:  the  non-compliance  Index,  to 
determine its exogeneity.  In the presence of endogeneity, the OLS estimates would be 
biased and inconsistent, as reflected by the difference in standard errors under the OLS 
approach and the instrumental variables approach used to control for endogeneity.  In the 
absence of endogeneity, that is if the Index is exogenous, which one a priori assumes to 
be so, in view of the prescriptive nature of the Code, the standard errors under both 
approaches would be the same.
To perform the Wu-Hausman exogeneity test, we first run an OLS regression modelling 
the Index.  The residuals from this regression are then used as an additional explanatory 
variable in the OLS regression of the TSR on the Index and other explanatory variables.  
If the second equation’s F-statistic is low, the Index is accepted as exogenous.  Based on 
prior empirical findings, it is expected that the Index could be influenced by the size of 
the board and directors’ shareholdings, since these are a measure of the power of the 
directors ( mainly executive, who are usually the main shareholders)  over the board, and 
hence their ability to control its structure, composition and functioning.  The Index may 
also be related to block holdings, since large block holders (mainly institutions) can also 
exert influence over the board structure and composition.  Actions of CalPERS in the US, 
as well as recent news on the role of the institutional shareholders over appointments in 
the  board,  recently  the  Sainsbury  PLC  Case  in  the  UK,  are  a  few  examples  of  the 
influence of block holders on board composition and structure.  We therefore first run a 
regression of the Index on board size, director shareholdings and block holdings.   Year 
dummies are included to capture the effect of variation in time. 23
TABLE 9
Step 1:  OLS Regression of the Index on its Explanatory Variables
Explanatory Variables Coefficients and t-ratios
















No. Of  Obsv. 478
*,  **,  ***  denote  significance  at  the  0.10,  0.05,  and  0.01  level.  t-statistics  are  in 
parenthesis.
As can be seen from the above table, the Index is significantly positively correlated with 
the block holdings and director holdings suggesting that significant shareholders, that is,  
those holding  3% or above stock in the company, whether outsiders or insiders, have a 
negative influence on compliance.  The negative relationship of director shareholdings 
with compliance also lends support to the entrenchment hypothesis, considering that most 
significant shareholders among directors are generally the insiders.   24
TABLE 10
Step 2A: OLS regression of the TSR on its explanatory variables &
Step2B: Variable Addition Test (Wu-Hausman Test for Determining the Exogeneity 
of the Index)
Explanatory Model 1 (OLS) Model  2  (Variable  Addition 
Test: OLS Case) 
Index -2.26** -8.12
(-2.20) (-1.32)


















F-Statistic (p-value) 0.94 (.332)
No. of Observations.  478 478
*,  **,  ***  denote  significance  at  the  0.10,  0.05,  and  0.01  level.    t-statistics  are  in 
parentheses.
The low value of the F-statistic and its high p-value in model 2 in table 10 allow us to 
accept exogeneity of the Index.  To further confirm the above result, we carry out an 
instrumental variables estimation of the relationship between the TSR and the Index.  To 
carry out this estimation we use model 4 of table 7 as the base model.   Since there are six 
explanatory variables in the model, we use six instruments, even though there is only one 
explanatory variable which is suspected to be endogenous: the Index.  This would be a 
case  of  over-identification,  which  is  acceptable.    The  instruments  used  need  to  be 
correlated with the Index.  Since we have already found the Index to be significantly 
correlated with director share holdings as well as block holdings, we will use these along 
with four other variables as instruments.  These being: board size; leverage; ROA; and a 
slope dummy on the Index for year 1.    
Comparison of the results of the OLS and Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation are 
presented in Table 11.  Coefficients and standard errors are presented on the same line. T-
ratios are in parentheses.25
TABLE 11
Comparison of results from OLS and IV estimation.  Dependent variable is the TSR.

















No. of  Observations 478 478
*,  **,  ***  denote  significance  at  the  0.10,  0.05,  and  0.01  level.    t-statistics  are  in 
paranthesis.
As can be seen from the above table, the coefficients, their signs as well as their standard 
errors under both the OLS as well as the IV estimation technique are identical.  This 
result  not  only further  strengthens  the  exogeneity  of  the  Index,  but  also implies  that 
causality runs from the Index to firm performance rather than the other way round.  
7.0 Discussion
One clear result that emerges from the preceding analysis is that compliance with the 
Code  of  corporate  governance  does  matter  for  investors  in  the  stock  of  large  listed 
companies in the UK.  This result contrasts sharply with previous research. There are 
however a number of reasons why the earlier research may not have been able to detect 
such a relationship.  One possibility could be the choice of performance measure used.  
Earlier findings suggest that the governance-performance link tends to be sensitive to the 
choice of  performance  measure.  Whereas  certain  governance mechanisms  may have 
more  of  an  impact  on  accounting  based  measures,  others  may  be  more  relevant  for 
market based measures (board size vs. managerial equity ownership, the former being 
more  relevant  for  accounting  returns,  while  the  latter  more  so  for  market-sensitive 
measures).  Previous relevant studies in the UK (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998: Weir, 
Laing and Mcknight, 2002) have used a proxy for Tobin’s Q (given by the market value 
of equity plus book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets) as a measure 
of  firm  performance.     This  measure using  historical  accounting  based  values  in  the 
denominator,  may  not  be  able  to  capture  adequately  the  investors’  perceptions  of 
companies’ governance structures.  Total shareholder return (TSR) in contrast uses the 
market value of equity as the base in calculating both dividend yield as well as capital 26
gain and hence, is arguably better able to reflect the investors’ perceptions of ‘improved 
governance’ in line with higher compliance.  
Additionally,  although  the  Index  is  not  significantly  correlated  with  the  accounting 
measures of return, it is worth noting the correlation between the Index and the ROA and 
that between the TSR and the ROA.   In line with the relationship with the TSR, the 
Index is insignificantly but still negatively correlated with the ROA, which in turn is 
significantly positively correlated with the TSR.  This suggests that firms which are more 
compliant and tend to enjoy higher market returns also tend to be more profitable.
Another  possible  reason  for  the  contrast  with  the  findings  of  previous  studies  is  the 
emphasis in  this  work on constructing a finely  tuned and comprehensive  measure of 
compliance with the board-related provisions of the Code. The Index developed in this 
study incorporates elements of compliance not only in terms of the letter but also in terms 
of the spirit of the Code, which aims to encourage a significant ‘independent’ presence 
on the board that can perform the monitoring function effectively. The Index developed 
in this study incorporates elements of board independence not captured by any of the 
previous studies in either the UK or the US.  In the UK, Buckland (2001) and Weir, 
Laing and McKnight (2002) have pointed to the inadequate attention given to measuring 
board independence which constitutes a significant weakness in their work.  Although 
directly comparable studies are not currently available for the US, studies such as those 
of Weisbach (1988) and Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) suggest that outside directors can 
play  a  potentially  positive  role  in  the  monitoring  of  the  board  of  directors,  and  by 
implication in enhancing firm performance/value.  Evidence of such a positive impact of 
the outside directors has also recently been reported by Black, Jang and Kim (2005), who 
find that listed Korean companies with 50% or more outside directors are valued more 
highly by the market as reflected by their Tobin’s q.    
The  argument  related  to  the  importance  of  the  independent  element  on  the  board  in 
influencing  investor  perceptions  is  further  strengthened  by  another  interesting 
relationship  that  emerges  from  the  preceding  analysis  -    that  between  the  Index  and 
director shareholdings.  The Index is found to be highly significantly positively correlated 
with the director shareholdings, suggesting that firms having significant director share 
holdings  tend  to  be  less  compliant.    However  the  Index  is  significantly  negatively 
correlated  with  the  TSR.    Taken  together,  these  findings  support  the  entrenchment 
hypothesis, that is, firms having higher director shareholdings (which most often tend to 
be insiders) also tend to be non-compliant and perhaps suffer from greater agency costs, 
leading to lower total shareholder returns.   
Finally, the study is the  first in the UK context to test, in a methodologically sound 
manner, the potentially endogenous nature of the relationship between the Index and firm 
performance. Our  results  find no evidence of  endogeneity of  the  Index.  This  finding 
raises  concerns  about  the  validity  of  studies  which  a  priori  assume  the  governance 
variables to be endogenous, with the ensuing implication that the lack of a significant 
relationship  between  various  measures  of  governance  and  firm  performance  simply 
signify that the companies are in equilibrium with respect to their governance choices.  27
Our findings suggest that the Index is exogenous and the causality most likely runs from 
the Index to firm performance rather than the other way round. 
8.0 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed an Index based on the level of non-compliance with the 
UK code of corporate governance by large industrial companies that are constituents of 
the FTSE 350 index.  We have then investigated whether compliance matters for firm 
performance,  including  both  market-based  as  well  as  accounting  measures  of 
performance.  We find  that there is a clear link  between compliance  and the market 
driven  measure  of  firm  performance,  i.e.,  the  total  shareholder  return  (TSR),  with 
increasing compliance leading to increasing total  shareholder return in our sample of 
companies. No evidence of such a relationship is found, however, between compliance 
and the accounting measures of firm performance, return on assets (ROA) and return on 
equity (ROE). The results suggest that although compliance may not improve a firm’s 
operating  performance,  it  does  improve  investors’  perceptions  of  the  governance  of 
companies, with the resultant impact on firm value. Given the nature of the Index, these 
findings also suggest, that for investors compliance matters not only with respect to the 
letter but also the spirit of the Code, who want to see it not just as a box ticking exercise 
but as a real change in the governance of large listed companies in the UK.  28
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